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Previously Taxed Property And The
Federal Estate Tax
BORIS 1. BITTKER AND JAMES B. FRANKEL
IN 1918 Congress added to the then simple but rapidly proliferating
estate tax law a deduction for property previously ta."'ed, the prototype
of today's section 812(c).1 In recommending the new provision, the
House Committee on Ways and Means said::I "
•It has come to the attention of the committee that persons closely related have
died within such a short space of time that the same estate passing within a
short period of time has been subjected to the estate ta.", and thereby dimin-
ished unreasonably because of the short period within which the two levies
have been made. For example, a husband dies leaving a large amount of
property to his wife, an elderly woman, who dies within a few weeks after
her husband's death. Under existing law the entire estate is taxed on the
transfer from husband to wife and on the transfer from wife to other benefi-
ciaries.
To alter this result the Committee recommended and Congress adopted
a provision allowing the executor to deduct from the decedent's gross
estate any part thereof that was received by the decedent, directly or by
exchange, from the taxable estate of any other person who had died within
the previous five years. The provision was simple and straightfonvard.ll
BORIS I. BlTTKER (B.A., Cornell University; LL.B., Yale University) is Professor of
Law at Yale Law School, member of the New York and Connecticut Bars, and author of
several important contributions to ta." literature.
JAMES B. FRANKEL (B.S., United States Naval Academy; LL.B., Yale University) is
a member of the California Bar.
1 I.Re. §812(c) is reprinted as an appendix to the te.'\."t, illlra p. 285. Although the
present provision's antecedents were numbered variously, all are referred to in the t~-t
by the present session number, §812(c). I.Re. §861 (a) (2) is the parallel deduction for
non-residents who are not citizens.
2 H. R REp. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-3 (1918), 1939-1 C~..s. BULL. (Part 2)
86, 102. In CA-plaining the bill, Representative Claude Kitchin said, "We oo.\"e another
very just provision, that if a person who receives a share of an estate dies within five
years from the death of the person from whom he receives the estate, his share shall not
pay another transfer ta." within the five-year period." 56 CoNG. R£c. (Part 12) 692
(1918).
3 "Sec. 403. That for the purpose of the ta." the value of the net estate shall be deter-
mined-
(a) In the case of a resident, by deducting from the value of the gross estate- •••
(2) An amount equal to the value at the time of the decedent's death of any propert}·,
real, :Personal, or mixed, which can be identified as having been received by the decedent
263
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The principle commended itself to the states, some thirty of which now
have an analogous allowance.'
When Congress enacted the deduction, the estate tax rates were, by
present standards, mild-although of course bitterly assailed as confisca-
tory at the time. The unhappy couple mentioned in the House Report,
for example, would have paid a total of about $3 million on a net estate
of $10 million. Today's rates would exact about $6.7 million upon two
transfers of an estate of similar size.G
But in the thirty-four intervening years the deduction for previously
taxed property has become so circumscribed by a multitude of restrictions
that-in all but verbiage-it is only a shadow of its former self. Origi-
nally the deduction was allowed whenever a decedent's estate contained
property either received by him as a share in the estate of a prior decedent
or "identified as having been acquired . . . in exchange for property so
received," provided that the prior decedent had died within the previous
five years and that his estate had been taxed.o To these conditions Con-
gress has over the years added several others. Moreover, the size of the
deduction, once an estate qualifies for it, has been drastically reduced in
most cases by a series of complicated limitations. Finally, the addition
in 1948 of the marital deduction to the federal estate and gift tax laws
was accompanied by a blanket denial of the previously taxed property de-
duction to any property received from the decedent's spouse.T The only
as a share in the estate of any person who died within five years prior to the death of
the decedent, or which can be identified as having been acquired by the decedent in c..'C-
change Ior property so received, if an estate tax under the Revenue Act of 1917 or under
this Act was collected from such estate, and if such property is included in the decedent's
gross estate; ...." Revenue Act of 1918, Sec. 403 (a) (2).
, Of the jurisdictions having something on the order of a deduction for property previ-
ously taxed, twenty-one have death levies based on the inheritance tax principle, often
accompanied by a separate estate tax to take advantage of the federal credit for death
taxes paid to a state: Cal., Colo., Del., Dist. of Col., Idaho, Hawaii, Iowa, Kan., Ky.,
Minn., Mont., Neb., N.C., Ore., S.c., Tenn., Tc.."., Va., Wash., W. Va., and Wis. Two
states (N.Y. and Okla.) have two separate estate taxes; two (N.D. and Utah) have a
Single estate tax; and five (Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., Miss.) have an estate tax designed simply
to absorb the federal credit. Twenty-one jurisdictions have no provision for property pre-
viously ta."ed: Alaska, Ariz., Conn., Ill., Ind. (proviso in 1929 law abandoned in 1931),
La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Mo., Nev. (no death levies of any sort), N.H., N.]., N.M.,
Ohio, Pa., R.I., S.D., Vt., and Wyo.
Of the thirty jurisdictions which have an allowance for property previously taxed,
twenty-three provide for a "deduction" or its practical equivalent, an "exemption." The
remaining seven allow a "credit" for prior taxes paid. See fllrtller note 16 i/lfra. The
federal law seems to be the source of these state statutes. Cf. CCH INH., EST. AND GIFT
TAX REP. 80, 288. No state provisions pre-date the federal one.
G Assuming that the marital deduction was available to the first decedent but not to the
second.
oSf/pra note 3.
T Infra p. 282.
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extension of the deduction carne in 1924 when, with the enactment of
the first federal gift tax, Congress provided that property received by a
taxable gift within five years prior to the decedent's death might be
deducted.8
Despite this one enlargement of the scope of section 812(c), one may
safely say that it accomplishes less work per clause than any other in the
federal estate tax law; indeed, in this respect it may be without a peer in
the entire Code.
The authors propose to examine this abject remnant in some detail.
Our aim is both to describe what it is today, an unrewarding task that
seems not to have been undertaken previously, and to evaluate the need
for it or for some substitute.
THE CONDITIONS
Section 812 (c) has always required that the property in question have
been received by a taxable transfer. Originally this meant that it had to
be received from an estate that was taxed; but since 1924, as stated above,
property received from a donor by a taxable gift wiII quaIify.D Since 1932
a gift or estate tax must have been "finally determined and paid by or
on behalf of such donor, or the estate of such prior decedent, as the case
may be." The statute also requires that the property in question have been
part of the taxable estate or taxable gift.10
The Requirement of a Taxable Transfer. These conditions can cause
an amusing reversal of the usual roles of tah-payer and Treasury, with
the latter vigorously asserting that the prior decedent or donor owes no
tax, while the executor or donor, mindful of the interests of the trans-
feree, seeks to force a tax payment on the Treasury.ll In one case an
8 Revenue Act of 1924, Sec. 303 (a) (2). The 1924 gift ta.>: also included a deduction
for property previously ta."Ced. Id. Sec. 321(a)(4). Cf. Estate of Parker. 35 B.T.A. 609
(1937). But when the gift ta."C was fe-enacted in 1932, this deduction was not carried
fu~~ •
9 The transfer by gift must have occurred within five years of the decedent's death.
In the case of property received by testamentary transfer, however, Ule five )ocars is cal-
culated not from receipt but from the prior decedent's death. Second National Bank .....
Comm'r, 63 F2d 815 (6th Cir. 1933) (TV died Aug. 4, 1918; distribution of estate oc-
curred June 8,1920; A died Apr. 22, 1925. Deduction denied).
10 Thus, if inclusion of the property was resisted by the c."Cecutor of the prior estate.
and the dispute was settled by a partial inclusion, only Utat part can be deducted. Lough-
ridge's Estate v. Comm'r, 183 F.2d 294 (lOUt Cir. 1950), YCi!crsillg i,~ part 11 T.e. 963
(1948); Horlick v. Kuhl, 62 F.Supp. 168 (EoD. Wis. 1945).
11 This is not the only point at which the executor and Commissioner may find them-
selves in each other's shoes. If A makes an inter vivos gift of previously ta...cd propert}·,
paying a gift tax, his executor may try to prove that it is includible in the gross estate.
e.g., as a gift in contemplation of death. For its inclusion may be offset by the section
812(c) deduction, thus costing nothing; and, at the same time. it will give rise to a credit
for the gift tax paid on the transfer.
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executor, miscalculating the value of the first estate, found a small tax
due and paid it. The Government's audit disclosed that the estate was
not taxable. Even though the statute of limitations had not run, however,
the executor refused to accept a refund check. The Court held that the
Government's acceptance of the executor's erroneous payment was a mere
administrative act and not a "final determination" of a tax under section
81Z(c). Hence the property did not qualify for the deduction.12
In another case the Commissioner had asserted that certain transfers
by the prior decedent were taxable under section 811 (c) and had assessed
and collected a deficiency on that basis. Thereupon the property was de-
ducted under section 81Z (c) by the estate of a second decedent. The
Commissioner then proposed an over-assessment on the first estate, re-
versing his original contention that the property should be included. He
simultaneously denied the section 81Z (c) deduction to the estate of the
second decedent. The latter estate paid the tax in full and sued for a
refund. The District Court held (a) that the property was properly in-
cludible in the estate of the prior decedent and (b) that the payment by
the first estate of a tax assessed by the Treasury satisfied the llfinality"
requirement of the statute.18
These cases are far from settling all the possible issues which may
arise from such inconsistent positions. May property be deducted under
section 81Z(c) where a tax was erroneously paid on its transfer if the
tax has not been refunded and the statute of limitations on a refund has
run? If the Treasury erroneously asserts a deficiency against the trans-
feror, is it thereafter disabled from disallowing a deduction under sec-
tion 81Z (c) to the transferee? If the deduction is allowed, what is the
consequence of a later action for refund by the transferor? If the tax
is refunded and if the transferee is the sole beneficiary of the prior estate,
do the principles of estoppel or recoupment prevent a section 81Z(c) de-
duction by the transferee? Can the transferee claim a section 81Z(c)
deduction while the transferor is disputing or litigating his liability for
tax on the transfer?
Of greater import than these teasing problems of construction is the
all-or-nothing character of the statute's requirement that the transferor
have been taxed on the property in question. If the prior estate was
valued at $60,000, so that by reason of the specific exemption no ta.."\:
was due, no part of the estate will qualify under section 81Z(c). If,
12 Hermann S. Vath, 41 B.T.A. 487 (1940).
18 Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. United States, 80 F.Supp. 787, 790-1 (N.D.
Cal. 1948). Under the statute, the property in question is covered if it is included in com-
puting the tax as "finally determined." Since it is apparently irrelevant that it was im-
properly included, it is not apparent why the Court felt called upon to decide that inclusion
was in fact proper.
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however, the prior estate had been valued at $60,001, so that a nominal
tax was paid, the entire estate would qualify under section 812(c). Simi-
larly, if a donee receives $33,000 and no tax is paid by the donor because
of the specific exemption and e.'{clusion, the property will not qualify;
increase the supposed gift to $33,001, and it becomes qualified.u The
availability of the deduction, then, is wholly independent of the rate at
which the property was ta.'{ed on the prior transfer. This fact cannot
easily be reconciled with the Congressional aim of preventing the unrea-
sonable depletion of a family fortune when two deaths fall within a short
period. It has seemed so bizarre to two state courts that they interpreted
analogous (though somewhat differently phrased) state statutes to per-
mit the deduction of only a part of the property.la Other states have
avoided the result by granting a credit for the ta.'{ paid on the prior trans-
fer instead of allowing the value of the property itself to be deducted.111
Even if the prior estate was taxed, section 812(c) specifically denies
the deduction if a similar deduction was allowed to the prior estate for
the property in question. Thus if A bequeaths property to B, who in tum
leaves it to C, and all three die within five years, B's estate may deduct
the property under section 8I2(c), but C's estate may notP If, on the
other hand, B (after inheriting the property from A's estate) had trans-
ferred it to C by gift in contemplation of death,I8 C's estate could claim
the deduction, notwithstanding that B's estate enjoyed both a gift tax
credit as well as a section 8I2(c) deduction on the property.1ll In so
14 Estate of Schmidt, 19 T.G. No. 10 (1952). Property received by gift in one ;:,'car
was held not to qualify under section 812(c) because the donor applied his c."clusion and
part of his specific exemption against it and paid no ta.~ Property received the foUow-
ing year (to the eA-tent that it exceeded the e."c1usion, see note 44 infra) was conceded
to be qualified under section 812(c) because the donor was ta."ed although he applied
against the gift the e."c1usion and the balance of the specific C."cmptiOIL Presumably if
both gifts had been made in a single year, both would have qualified under section 812(c).
15 Estate of Letchworth, 201 Cal. 1, 255 Pac. 195 (1927); In re Nilson, 201 Iowa 1033,
204 N.W. 244 (1925).
16 They are: CoL, Ky., Mont, N.D., Tenn., Va., and Wis. For a proposal that this
technique be applied to the federal tax, see p. 285 in/raj Oakes, The Rc-Jisio,~ of Ille Federal
Estate Tax. 34 PRoc. NAT. TA.'\: A. 429, 433 (1941).
1.'1' Apparently B's estate may not transfer its rights to C's estate foregoing the deduc-
tion; the statute denies a deduction to C's estate if the deduction was "allowable" to B's
estate.
18 Or, presumably, by any other kind of inter vivos transfer bringing the property into
the gross estate.
19 Estate of Marjorie Hart, 2 T.e. 1246 (1943). The statute denies the deduction
where a similar deduction was allowed in determining the "net estate of the prior
decedent" This restriction was held to be inapplicable where the property 'was acquired
by gift rather than by inheritance, even though the donor's estate may have had a section
81Z(c) deduction in respect of the property.
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holding, the Tax Court called the section's draftsmanship "poor" and
acknowledged that the result "may seem strange." The Court was cor-
rect on both scores. The basic statutory scheme of taxing gifts in con-
templation of death and allied transfers in the same way as testamentary
transfers is impaired, since e's estate will be better off if he received the
property by a gift in contemplation of death (or other i'nter vivos trans-
fer) from B than if he received it by inheritance.2o
The Necessity for "Identifying" the Property. In addition to show-
ing that the property was acquired from a taxable estate or donor (and,
if from the former, that no section 812 (c) deduction was allowable to
the transferor), the claimant estate must establish that the
property can be identified as having been received by the decedent from the
donor by gift, or from such prior decedent by gift, bequest, devise, or inheri-
tance, or ... can be identified as having been acquired in exchange for prop-
erty so received.
This part of section 812 (c) creates two conditions: there must have
been a receipt of property by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance; 21 and
property in the estate must be traced back to the transferee.
The meaning of the first requirement has been substantially clarified by
several judicial pronouncements and statutory amendments. Property re-
ceived by the present decedent in settlement of claims asserted against a
prior estate does not come within section 812 (c).22 This is only logical,
since the prior estate was allowed to deduct the amount of the claims and,
as a consequence, the transfer of the property in question was not taxed.
On the other hand, the spirit of the statute quite clearly calls for the
allowance in several situations where the Treasury formerly resisted it.
Thus, at one time the Treasury took the position that the proceeds of life
20 Perfect coordination of the treatment of gifts in contemplation of death and otlter
lifetime substitutes for transfers at death with the treatment of testamentary transfers is
already prevented by the fact that the gift tax paid is not added back to the estate. This
indefensible concession to inter vivos transfers is counterbalanced, however, by the va-
garies of the gift tax credit, which may be less than the amount actually paid, and by the
failure to allow interest on the "down payment."
21 The statute speaks of property "received by the decedent from the donor by gift, or
from [the] prior decedent by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." Confusion has been
generated by the repetition of the word "gift." The reason for the repetition is that
receipt from a prior decedent "by gift, bequest," etc. was intended to include gifts in con-
templation of death and otb,er inter vivos substitutes for testamentary transfers. Scc Moses
E. Greenebaum, 12 B.T.A. 823 (1928); Estate of Marjorie Hart, S1lpra note 19. The
other reference to receipt by gift was added when in 1924 the statute was extended to
include property received by a transfer taxed under the new gift tax.
22 Hull v. Continental Illinois Bank, 177 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1949). A portion of the
property received by the second decedent from the estate of the first was in settlement of
a claim of heirship; this part the Treasury allowed under section 812(c). C/. Guaranty
Trust Co., 3 B.T.A. 459 (1926) (property received from prior estate "in settlement of
certain lawsuits").
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insurance were not received by "gift, bequest, devise or inheritance.":::1
It sought similarly to disqualify property held in joint tenanc}' with the
prior decedent, arguing that acquisition by the right of sun'ivorship was
not "by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance.":2{ Both arguments were un-
successful, and the Treasury regulations now acknowledge that the stat-
ute embraces property received by the decedent as a joint tenant or tenant
by the entirety and as a beneficiary of life insurance, as well as commu-
nity property and property received as dower or curtesy.:2a Since 1942
section 812(c) has embraced property which was taxed to the prior de-
cedent or donor because he possessed a power of appointment.::a More-
over, the regulations take the position that if the prcsel/t decedent is the
possessor of a power of appointment, the property came to him by "gift"
or by "gift, bequest, devise or inheritance." :27
While it is thus comparatively simple to determine whether or not
property was received by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, it is fre-
quently difficult to establish that the transferee's estate includes propert}'
which "can be identified" as the property so received or as having been
acquired in exchange therefor. But this second condition of the proviso
quoted above must be complied with to get tlle deduction. If the propert)'
in question is Blackacre, identification is easy enough: A owned it, B
inherited it, B owned it at the time of his death. Similarly, if A owned
and bequeathed to B 100 shares of Consolidated Boondoggles, Inc., and
B died owning 1,000 shares of Amalgamated 'Vidgets, Inc., acquired for
the Boondoggle stock when that company was merged into 'Vidgets, the
Widget shares "can be identified . . . as having been acquired in c..,-
change for property" received by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.
But what if B inherited money or inherited Blackacre and sold it? Can
the property included in B's gross estate-whether cash, securities, real
estate, life insurance, jewelry, or what not-be "identified as having been
acquired in exchange" for the inherited property? The issue most fre-
quently litigated under section 812(c) has been this question of identi-
fication.
The first round-in which was decided the leading case, Rodcl/bough
v. United States :28-ended ominously for the ta.'\.-payer. Elizabeth Roden-
23 Louise A. Gardner, 22 B.T.A. 1076 (1931). Here the Board of Ta." Appeals allowed
a deduction for property traceable to life insurance proceeds. But it reduced the nllo·....-
able deduction to account for the $40,000 of life insurance which was e."cmptcd (under
pre-I942 law) from taxation in the prior estate.
2' Comm'r v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Co., 59 F.2d 50S (7th Cir. 1932).
25 Reg. 105, Sec. 81.41 (a)(l).
26 Revenue Act of 1942, Sec. 407(a) (1).
27 Sf/pra note 25.
28 25 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1928).
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bough was one of three residuary legatees under the will of her father,
who died in 1918. From his estate she received securities worth nearly
four million dollars. She sold some of these securities and deposited the
proceeds in her personal bank account. About the same time she pur-
chased other securities, paying for them with checks drawn on the same
bank account. Upon her death in 1921, her executor claimed a deduction
for property previously taxed, viz., the securities purchased in the man-
ner just related. , The Commissioner took the position that the decedent's
estate could ded4ct only the very property inherited or other property
"exchanged" .for it in the most literal sense, i.e., acquired by barter.
Moreover, he asserted that there could be only one such "exchange." A
sale of inherited property followed by a reinvestment of the proceeds
would not qualify. In fact, the Commissioner took the extreme view that
even the proceeds of sale would not qualify unless received and held in
the form of cash. If the property was paid for by check, and the check
was deposited in a bank, the Commissioner argued that there were two
exchanges: an exchange of the inherited property for the check; and an
exchange of the check for the bank's unsecured promise to pay I 20 This
preliminary skirmish was won by the taxpayer. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that there could be any number of exchanges,
so long as the property for which the deduction was claimed could be
traced back to the inherited property. This view has been accepted by
the regulations,80 and no more has since been heard of the Commissioner's
restricted view of the meaning of "exchange."
But a second, more troublesome point was raised by the Treasury in
the Rodenbaugh case-the question of commingling. The parties had
stipulated "that Mrs. Rodenbough deposited all moneys that came to her
from all sources in one general bank account and that she thus com-
mingled moneys originally her own and moneys which arose from the
sale or other disposition of securities she had received from her father's
estate." 81 How could the securities owned at the time of her death "be
identified as having been acquired in exchange" for the inherited secu-
rities? The Commissioner insisted that the executor must produce evi-
dence linking the purchased securities to the inherited property. The ex-
ecutor asserted that it should be presumed that the decedent had used
20 1 B.T.A. 477, 482 (1925).
80 Reg. 105, Sec. 81.43. See also Cary v. United States, 22 F.2d 298 (W.n.N.Y. 1927) ;
Estate of Isabella C. Hoffman, 3 B.T.A. 1361 (1926). State courts, construing similar
provisions, have arrived at the same result. In re Cooper's Estate, 65 N.Y.S.2d 263
(Surr.Ct.N.Y.Co.l946); b~ re Raynolds' Estate, 219 Minn. 449, 18 N.W.2d 238 (1945).
81 Sn/Jra note 28, at 17.
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the proceeds of inherited property for her investments and her "own"
funds for her personal eA-penditures.
The Court, however, refused to presume that 32
this lady, differing from our observation of others of her se.....:, reached into a
common fund and carefully selected for reinvesbnent those moneys which had
come to her from the sale and liquidation of particular securities that she bad
received from a particular source. Rather than setting up such a presumption,
common experience, we think, indicates that she drew funds for reinvesbnent
without thought of their source.
In remanding, the Court stated that if no other evidence was available,
it would be necessary to rely upon an analysis of the bank deposits and
withdrawals. The purchased securities could then be traced back to the
inherited property only to the eA1:ent the amounts withdrawn for invest-
ment were too large to have been supplied from non-inherited sources.
The outcome of the Rodenbough case, then, was not very promising
for the taxpayer.ss Although the Commissioner's absurdly circumscribed
S2Id.
ss The opinion on remand, not officially reported, may be found in 15 A.F.T.R. 551
(E.n. Pa. 1929). The Court found part of the property identifiable.
Tracing by the Rodenbaugh method can be even more of an obstacle to the deduction
than the facts in the case itself suggest. For even if it can be SbO\'ffi through an analj'sis
of the decedent's bank deposits that property was purchased with inherited funds, that
property in tum might have been later sold and the proceeds commingled 'with non-
previously taxed property. Suppose that thereafter property is purchased with a check
drawn on the mixed account and that this property is owned at de:lth. Presumablj' the
"Rodellbough rule" would have to be applied a second time. Consider this e.'mI1Jple: A
has $100,000 on deposit, of which $50,000 was the proceeds of a sale of inherited propert)·.
He spends $25,000 for his living e.-q>enses and buys securities for ~5,OOO. [Under the
Rodenbaugh rule if these securities were held until death, only $25,000 (in the absence
of other evidence) could be attributed to the inheritance.] A then sells the securities for
$75,000 and deposits the proceeds of sale. Thereafter he deposits in the smne :1I::count
$50,000 from other sources. He then uses $20,000 for personal e....'Penses and buys securi-
ties for $105,000. These securities are held until death. Presumably only $5.000 can he
traced back to the inheritance, because when the securities o\'med at death were purchased.
there were sufficient non-inherited funds on hand to cover $100.000 of their cost. Where
the decedent has bought and sold with some frequency. there may be rep-e:ltcd nibbling
away at the amount of property that can be traced back to inherited property. The contrast
between the decedent who kept his inherited property in a special account and the de-
cedent who commingled his funds is especially striking in such instances.
The example just described can also be used to illustrate certain unsettled issues under
the Rodenbaugh rule. If the final purchase of securities is of 10,500 shares of XYZ. Inc.
at $10 per share, and 500 shares are sold before death to meet living e....:penses. can nDj'
of the 10,000 shares left be traced back to the inherited property? Suppose the final pur-
chase consisted of $5.000 worth of the securities of each of 21 companies. Can the last
$5,000 order placed or filled be traced to the inherited property. so that if these are the
only securities left, they will qualify under section 812(c)? Suppose the first ~5,OOO
purchase assumed above (of which $25,000 is traceable to inherited property) is for se-
curities that increase in value, so that they bring $100,000 on a sale. When the proceeds
of this sale are deposited, how is the inherited property account to be credited in order
to apply the Rodellbough rule subsequently? Perhaps if all securities had increased by
the same percentage, the inherited property account would be treated as rising from
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definition of "exchange" was rejected, the necessity for an identification
came to the fore as a major problem. Commingling of funds, a natural
action, might prove fatal to the deduction.
It will be noted, however, that the implacable analysis of the RodcnM
bough case was to be applied only because "[t]he only evidence available
is . . . the decedent's deposits, withdrawals and balances shown in her
bank account." In several later cases this has been the chink in the Com~
missioner's armor. Thus, where the decedent indicated that she wished
"to purchase securities from the funds bequeathed her from her mother's
estate," the securities so purchased were held to be traceable.34 It WOos
found in effect (in the words of the Rodenbough rule) that the decedent
had "reached into a common fund and carefully selected for reinvestment
those moneys which had come to her" by inheritance. In another case,
where no testimony of the decedent's desires was presented, the Court
virtually established a presumption that the decedent "intended to pttrM
chase the new securities from the proceeds of the sale of the old," 30 The
Court went on to say:
To apply the Rodenbaugh rule would not be realistic. It would not be in accord
with human experience.36
The Court emphasized that the decedent in question was "an experienced
investor." On the same day, however, the same Court applied the Rodcll~
bough rule where there was "an entire failure" to establish the decedent's
intent.3r
$25,000 to $33,333. But what if some securities tripled in value while others declined?
Can particular securities be allocated to the inherited property account, on the assumption
that the last $25,000 bought were, by the Rodenbough rule, acquired with traceable funds?
If so, can this assumption be applied where the entire $75,000 were bought on the same
day, by reference to the order in which the broker was told to buy the various securities
or by an analysis of the hour and minute when each order was e.xecuted?
34 Wiggin v. Hassett, 56 F.Supp. 263 (Mass. 1944). See also Estate of Miller, 3 T.C.
1180 (1944).
85 Horlick v. Kuhl, 62 F.Supp. 168, 174 (E.D. Wis. 1945).
36 Supra note 35, at 174. The Court went on to indicate that it thought "the Roden-
bough rule" was to assume that the second decedent always intellded to draw on his In-
heritance for his living expenses and on his other funds for his investments. Of course,
the Rodellbough rule meant simply that if the executor, who must establish the source of
the property he seeks to deduct, can offer no other evidence than the bank records, he
has not traced any investments to the inherited property if there are other funds with
which the investments could have been made.
3r Van Dyke v. Kuhl' 78 F.Supp. 698 (E.D. Wis. 1945). The Court distinguished tho
Horlick case, supra note 35, as one "where all the facts and circumstances clearly Indi-
cated an intent by the second decedent to purchase the new securities from the proceeds
of the old." The Horlick opinion, however, sets out no "facts and circumstances," except
that the decedent there was "an experienced investor" whose bank balance, before the
proceeds of the inheritance were deposited, was "quite low." The Court then asked:
"How can there be any doubt that he intended to purchase the new securities from the
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Apparently only "an experienced investor" could be presumed to have
the requisite thought of the source of his investment. It remained for
Judge Learned Hand, in deciding another commingling issue under sec-
tion 81Zec), to administer what could be the CO%tp de grace to the Roden-
baugh rule. He held that, in the absence of evidence, he would assume
that the action most favorable to the ta>..-payer was taken, apparently be-
cause if the consequences had been understood that was the action that
would unquestionably have been taken.3B He was then speaking of an
executor, who of course has a fiduciary obligation to act thus, but the
decedent himself also has a motive, though not a duty, to pursue his se1f-
interest. This rationale would serve to bury the Rodenbaugh rule even
as to giddy females and shiftless males.3D
In exami~ng the Rodenbaugh rule and its competitors, one is struck
by the fact that persons in precisely the same economic circumstances will
be treated differently, depending upon whether someone can be found to
testify that the decedent's fondest desire was to reinvest his inheritance
or upon whether a court will assume that that was what he probably
wanted. The deduction can be insured by depositing the funds in a sep-
arate account and drawing on it for investments. It is sticking in the
bark to deny the deduction for want of a formality having utterly no
non-tax consequences.
proceeds of the sale of the old?" In the Horlick case, the Court seems to reject the
Rodenbough rule and to adopt its e.'\."act opposite, yet in the Vou DS1:c ClSe tlle Court
seems to embrace the Rodmbough approach.
3B Blair v. Dustin's Estate, 30 F.2d 774 (2d Gr. 1929). The issue here arose under a
proviso added to section 812 (c) in 1921 (since repealed, sec pp. 277-8), providing that pre\i-
ously ta.."ed property could be deducted only if it was not deducted as (i.e., used to P3}')
administration expenses or charitable bequests. The executors of the estate in question had
sold previously taxed property and deposited the proceeds in an account that also included
other funds and then drew checks on the commingled funds to pay charitable hequcsts
and administration e.'\.-penses. In holding that the remaining funds not so used could be
regarded as the previously ta.."ed property, Judge L. Hand said: "'We think that the
situation at bar is such as to justify raising a ••• presumption ••• that the e."ecutors
did act with a view to the estate's best interest, which, as we have said, is cquh'31ent to
assuming that they lrnew the law. Like any oilier presumption, it would cease, once
proof were introduced on the oilier side. Here there was none. So, while as mere matter
of reasoning we agree that we should have no right to conclude that they did so intend,
we hold the transaction one where justice requires us to act as though they had. If we
did not, we should have to presume iliat the earliest wiilidrawals were from the earliest
deposits, an equally gratuitous assumption, and adopted only in default of any oilier. It is
true that we might hold that, in the absence of all proof, ilie ta."payer should fail; but,
in so doing, we should abandon doctrines generally applicable to suc1l situations, whic1l
are dealt wiili by recourse of one sort or another to such devices." 30 F.2d 774, 776.
Query: Would proof that the e."ecutors acted in ignorance of ilie Jaw dissipate the
presumption?
39 The Tax Court has gone the whole way, holding that identification is sufficient, not-
withstanding a commingling of funds, if the cost of ilie new securities is lcss than the
proceeds of the old. Estate of Schroeder, 13 T.C. 259 (1949).
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It should be noted, however, that even the most lenient cases on com~
mingled funds will not help the poor (or rich) devil who draws on in~
herited funds for riotous living and later goes to work and saves his
earnings.40 His economic position may be precisely the same as his neigh~
bor's, but the deduction will be denied because the property owned at
death cannot be traced to the inheritance. Similarly, if he has separate
accounts for previously taxed property and for other assets but draws on
the latter account for his investments, they will not qualify under sec~
tion 812(c). So long as identification is required, formalism will take
precedence over equity among taxpayers.
Certain other questions of identification may also be briefly noted. It
is now established that securities acquired as a stock dividend or through
the exercise of subscription rights on previously taxed securities may
qualify for the deduction.41 Where property owned at death by the second
decedent was purchased by him from the prior decedent on credit, and
the debt was discharged with funds or property inherited from the prior
decedent, the property qualifies under section 812 (c).42 Similarly, where
the beneficiary of a prior estate, during its period of administration, borM
rowed money to purchase property, the property was held to qualify under
section 812(c) because the loan was paid off upon receipt of the legacy.4D
THE LIMITATIONS
Compliance with the foregoing conditions serves to qualify the property
under section 812 (c). The deduction, however, is not necessarily the full
value of the property so qualified; a variety of limitations now comes into
play to determine the amount of the deduction. These limitations include
provisions that limit the basic valuation assigned to a given item of prop-
40 See Estate of Schroeder, supra note 39, at 264: "Of course, if the previously taxed
cash had been deposited in this account and then withdrawn before additional non-previ-
ously taxed cash was deposited, it could not be said that the credit balance on the date of
decedent's death was traceable to previously taxed cash."
41 Blair v. Dustin's Estate, 30 F2d 774 (2d Cir. 1929). It was conceded that any new
money contributed upon exercise of the stock rights must be deducted from the final valu-
ation. If the rights are not e..'C:ercised but are sold instead, the proceeds (if properly identi-
fied) will qualify for the deduction. Estate of Susan K. Thorn, 16 B.T.A. 181 (1929).
42 Estate of Mary D. Gladding, 27 B.T.A. 385 (1932). Cf. McFadden v. United States,
20 F.Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
48 Estate of Devereux Milburn, 6 T.e. 1119 (1946). One Court has declined to follow
similar logic when it operated to the taxpayer's disadvantage. In Levi v. United States,
14 F.Supp. 513 (Ct. Ct. 1936), the decedent had been left certain corporate stock under
his wife's will. Before distribution of the wife's estate the decedent had made a gift to
his nephew of an equal amount of the same stock because he felt that his wife should
have left the stock to the nephew. The Court of Claims nevertheless allowed the dece-
dent's estate to deduct the stock received from his wife's estate.
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erty and others that reduce the amount so assigned to compensate for
certain attendant circumstances.
Valui11g the Previously Taxed Property. In the first place, in com-
puting the deduction the executor must use either the value of the prop-
erty as reported by him or its value as "finally determined" in reporting
the previous transfer, whichever is lower.44 If the property has declined
in value, the deduction cannot exceed its present value; if the value has
increased, the deduction cannot exceed the value previously taxed. Other-
wise, of course, the deduction would do more than simply prevent the
unduly rapid diminution of a family fortune; either appreciation would
go untaxed or (in the event of depreciation) the deduction would serve
to immunize the second decedent's non-inherited property from tax.
Where more than one item of property is involved, however, the aggre-
gate value may be used.4s Thus, if one or more items have decreased in
value between the two deaths while others have increased, the subsequent
estate is not limited to the lower value of each specific piece of property.
Depreciation in some items may be offset by appreciation in others.
44This valuation technique was added by the Revenue Act of 1929, Sec. 403(a)(2).
Under the 1918 Act the deduction was set at the value of the property in the second dece-
dent's estate. Supra note 3. But it was soon discovered that this gave the second decedent
a "windfall" if the property appreciated during the period he held it, and the statute was
amended. For cases discussing what is a "final determination" of the \'3lue of inherited
property where the executor of the prior estate and the Treasury were in dispute. sec
note 10 supra. See also on the valuation issue. Estate of Hauch, 19 T.e. No. 12 (1952).
Where the property was received by gift, the regulations take the position that only
the part that exceeds the e.-..:clusion is "the value of such property in determining the
value of the gift." Reg. 105, Sec. 81.41(b)(3), second paragraph. Thus, if propert)·
worth $24,000 is received by gift, and an e.-..:clusion of $·f,OOO is applied against it, only
the balance of $20,000 will qualify under section 812(c). The regulations go on to carry
to its logical e.weme this view that only the e...cess over the e...clusion 'was b."i:ed to the
transferor. If the property in question is worth $18,000 when the transferee dies, onl}. 5/6
(i.e.,20,000j24,OOO) of its value, or $15,000, may be deducted. This limitation is based on
the statutory language: "This deduction shall be allowed • • • only to the e....ient that
the value of Stich property is included in the decedent's gross estatc." The phrase "such
property" is apparently construed by the Treasury to mean the percentage of the property
that was reported as a "gift" by the donor. An attempt to apply somewhat similar reason-
ing to the specific exemption was rejected by the Ta... Court. Supra note 14.
At the opposite e...."treme is Virginia V. Gary, 30 B.T.A. 1143 (1934). Here the second
estate included a remainder interest, worth $285,000, in certain shares. The shares them-
selves had been included in the prior estate at the value of $375,000; at that time. the
remainderman's interest was worth $273,000. The Court held that "the property" had
been included in the prior estate at the value of $375,000. Pressed to its c....1reme, this
view would frustrate the Congressional purpose. There could be several remaindermen,
all claiming under section 812(c) ; if the property had appreciated, each might have an
interest worth $375,000. The aggregate section 812(c) deductions could then c."i:cecd the
value actually taxed, thus allowing the appreciation to escape 3. transfer b..... (In the
Gary case the stock had not in fact increased in value.)
45 This provision was added by the Revenue Act of 1932, Sec. 805.
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Claims Against the Transferor. In 1932 Congress enacted a corollary
to the rule that the deduction may not exceed the value of the property as
reported by and taxed to the prior estate or donor. If a mortgage or
other lien against the property was deducted in computing the tax on the
prior transfer, the section 812(c) deduction must be reduced to the ex-
tent that the mortgage or lien has been paid off.40 The proviso's effect
is best illustrated by an example. Assume that property worth $100,000,
subject to a mortgage of $25,000, was inherited, that the mortgage was
paid off by the second decedent, and that the property's present value
is still $100,000. The proviso has the effect of reducing the deduction to
$75,000. The theory is that only the equity of redemption, not the full
value, was taxed on the prior transfer.47
Where a claim was a lien against the entire prior estate, however, and
the present decedent is the sole beneficiary or residuary legatee of that
estate, the law is not so clearly defined. If the prior estate has not yet
been administered, it has been held that the decedent's estate may report
as property previously taxed only the net value of what is due him from
such prior estate.48 And if the decedent, acting as executor of the previous
estate, distributed to himself property subject to general liens and then
paid off those liens from his own funds, his estate may deduct only the
net value (property less liens) as property previously taxed. To the e..,-
tent he paid off the liens from his own funds, the decedent is a purchaser,
not a legatee.49 On the other hand, it has been held that the estate of a
decedent who receives property subject to a debt to himself may deduct
the full value of the property as previously taxed. Here the decision was
based on a finding that the decedent "waived his right" to collect the
46 Revenue Act of 1932, Sec. 806. Although the statute itself does not require that the
mortgage or lien have been applicable to the inherited property, this was its obvious in-
tention, as the regulations acknowledge. Reg. 105, Sec. 81.41 (b) (2). Sec H. R. REP.
No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1939-1 CUM. BULL. (Part 2) 457, 492. It has been held
immaterial that the debt was paid off with other funds of the estate rather than with
funds of the heir. Ransbottom's Estate v. C.I.R., 148 F2d 280 (6th Cir. 1945). This re-
sult was proper in the case itself, where the second decedent was the sole beneficiary of
the first estate, but would not comport with the statutory purpose if he were not.
47 If the value of the property had declined to $60,000, the deduction would be only
$35,000. Reg. 105, Sec. 81.41 (b)(2).
48 Bahr v. Comm'r, 119 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1941); Thomas v. Earnest, 161 F.2d 845
(5th Cir. 1947). The latter decision qualifies the former by holding that estate taxes
should not be deducted from the value of the prior estate in determining its net value.
This limitation is proper; the value of the estate before the estate tax is deducted is
what has been "previously taxed" so as to be entitled to immunity from a second tax.
~9 Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 159 F.2d 167 (2d CiT. 1947). The
Court asserted that "[i]t is of no consequence whether the debts were liens in a formal
sense upon the [prior decedent's] assets; it is enough that, if the [present decedent] did
not pay them, the creditors could follow them and sell them on execution." ld. at 168.
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debt due him.~o ·Where the income of the prior estate during adminis-
tration was used to payoff general debts of the prior estate, the courts
have gone both ways. Some allow the full value of the property in the
prior estate as a deduction.~1 Another court has limited the deduction to
the net value of the prior estate at the time of the prior decedent's death.:;:!
The latter result seems more in keeping with the purpose of the statute.
Claims Against the Transferee's Estate. Once the value of the prop-
erty has been adjusted to take account of elaims against the prior estate
or donor, it becomes necessary to make other (similarly downward) ad-
justments because of the elaims to which the property is subject in the
present estate. The general problem may be illustrated b)· assuming that
the property previously taxed is bequeathed by the second decedent to a
charity or used to pay administrative e.....-penses. May the estate deduct
both the u-pense or charitable bequest and also the property previously
taxed? Under the provision as first enacted it could.:;3
In 1921 Congress made its first move to deny SUell a double deduction.
The statute was amended to provide that the previously ta.,ed property
could be deducted under section 812 (c) only to the extent that it was not
deducted as a charitable contribution or as an e.....-pense.ta Form was thus
placed above substance, for the deduction now apparently depended upon
whether expenses or charitable legacies were paid witll previousl). ta.,ed
property or with some other item in the estate. In point of fact, the courts
neatly emasculated the restriction. Some did this by presuming that if
the executor commingled previously ta.,ed funds with otller funds, he
used the latter to pay u-penses and ellaritable bequests.:;:; Otllers held
even more boldly that if the estate had enough otller property to cover
the expenses and charitable bequests, tllere was no forbidden double
~o Estate of George Rice, 7 T.C. 223 (1946). Four judges dissented. The decision is
well criticized in a case note at 59 HARv. L. REv. 1315 (1946).
51 Comm'r v. Garland, 136 F.2d 82 (1st Cir. 1943); Constance C. Olurchill, P-H T.C.
:MEM. DEC. '144,086. These cases relied on a literal interpretation of tbe statute.
52:McCarthy v. Delaney, 76 F.Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1948). Here tbe Court specilica1l:r
repudiated the Garland rationale, supra note 51, even though tlmt case bad been decided
by its own Court of Appeals. It asserted that "[w]here A owing X money, leaves to B
all his estate, B's right to the property is junior to X's rigbt to reach the propert:,·. Re-
gardless of whether A's debts to X are paid out of the sale of some of tbe assets in A's
estate ... or out of the income which A's estate earns after A's death [and wbich is
therefore not a part of A's bequest to B], or out of B's pocket, tbe ''alue of the bequest
from A to B is the value of A's gross estate less the amount of A's debt to x." ld. at
473. It makes no difference, said the Court, whether what \\'as paid off '\'as a mortgage
or an "inchoate floating charge." Ibid.
53 Supra note 3.
54, Revenue Act of 1921, Sec. 403 (a) (2).
55 Blair v. Dustin's Estate, SlIpra note 38.
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deduction and consequently no occasion to limit the section 812(c)
deduction.56
Recognizing that the purpose of the 1921 restriction had "not been
entirely accomplished," Congress in 1932 extensively revised the statute.01
Its new approach was to charge the previously taxed property with a
portion of all the deductions (including the e,.xemption) allowed to the
second estate. Thus, if the gross estate was $300,000, of which $100,000
was previously taxed property, and the specific exemption and deductions
(other than for previously taxed property) came to $150,000, the previ-
ously taxed property would be reduced by its share (50 per cent) of the
exemption and other deductions. The deduction under section 812(c)
would then be $50,000.
In 1942 Congress refined (to speak charitably) the formula for charg-
ing previously taxed property with its "fair" share of the exemption and
other deductions, and the statute has not been changed in this respect
since.58 In giving the statute its present form, Congress was concerned
with the fact that some of the estate's deductible claims might be enforce-
able only against specific items of property. To the e,.xtent that the previ-
ously taxed property is not subject to a partcular claim against the estate,
it seemed unfair to reduce the section 812(c) deduction by any part of
that claim. On the other hand, some of the non-previously taxed prop-
erty might be immune to levy on a particular debt; in this event, it seemed
56 Seaboard National Bank, 11 B.T.A. 1386 (1928); Parrott v. United States, 42 F.2d
522 (N.D. Cal. 1929) ; Estate of Thorn, 16 B.T.A. 181 (1929); Emma C. Boetticher, 19
B.T.A. 616 (1930); Calvert Crary, 19 B.T.A. 634 (1930). In the Seaboard case tho
Board pointed out that under the strict construction urged by the Commissioner "the al~
lowance of the deduction for prior-taxed property would be made to depend upon accident,
mistake, or the method of bookkeeping employed by the executor, and we arc not per~
suaded that such was the intention of Congress in providing for the deduction in ques~
tion." (1396-7)
Where part of the property previously taxed was the subject of a specific charitable
bequest, however, the deduction under section 812(c) was limited to the balance. Estate
of Laura N. Kirkwood, 23 B.T.A. 955 (1931). This result also followed where the execu~
tor failed to show that there were available sufficient funds from other sources to satisfy
charitable bequests. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 6 B.T.A. 125 (1927).
57 Revenue Act of 1932, Sec. 806. See H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1939-1
CUM. Buu.. (Part 2) 457, 492.
58 Revenue Act of 1942, Sec. 405(b). The change in section 812(c) was inspired by
the same principle that occasioned an amendment then being made to I.R.C. §812(b),
relating to deductions for claims against the estate. !d. Sec. 405(a). This change limited
the deduction for such claims to the value of the property in the estate which could be sub~
jected to payment of the claims in the final settlement of the estate. Sec H. R. REP.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1942), 1942-2 CUM. Buu.. 372, 418. Ct. Estate of
Samuel Hirsch, 14 T.C. 509 (1950). Prior to this change, some e~tates had obtained
deductions in an amount which exceeded the value of property against which claimants
could proceed for satisfaction. E.g., Union Guardian Trust Co., 32 B.T.A. 996 (1935).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 8 Tax L. Rev. 279 1952-1953
1953] PREVIOUSLY TAXED PROPERTY AND FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 279
that such a claim should be fully allocated against the property (including
any previously taxed property) that was subject to it. The report of
the House Committee on Ways and Means gives this example of the
effect of the new provision: 69
This general rule may be illustrated by the case of a gross estate consisting of
Blackaere valued at $100,000, Whiteacre valued at $120,000, and insurance
proceeds, exempt from creditors' claims, in the amount of $100,000, and
deductions allowed under section 812(a), (b), and (d) totaling $170,000,
including a $20,000 mortgage enforceable only against Blackacre. If the
estate is entitled to a deduction under section 812(c) by reason of the inclusion
of Whiteaere in the estate of the prior decedent at a value of $120,000, under
section 81Z(c), as amended, the amount allowable as the deduction is $30,000,
computed by reducing $120,000 by ~~~~:~~~ of $120,000.
It may be noted that the statute goes much further than simply to
allocate against Blackacre and Whiteacre the full amount of the general
claims to which the insurance proceeds are not subject. For the deduc-
tions charged exclusively against the two parcels of real property include
the specific exemption. The insurance proceeds are taken out of the equa-
tion (because they are not subject to general claims) no matter how small
in amount the general claims may be.
On the other hand, the statute, in keeping with this favorable treat-
ment of property not subject to general claims, grants a boon to the estate
where the previously taxed property itself is immune to general claims.
To the extent that it is so immune, it is not cllarged with any of the
estate's deductions. To revert to the e..xample above, if Whiteacre were
immune to "general claims," its value would not be reduced at all.CO
59 H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1942), 1942-2 Ctp...L, BULL. 372, 492-
The computation can also be stated in the following manner, which follows more closely
the language of the statute. Let:
X= the amount by which the deduction is to be reduced;
A= "the amounts allowed as deductions under subsections (3), (d), and (c) and
the amounts of general claims [as defined in the penultimate sentence of section
812(c) ] allowed as deductions under subsection (b)";
B = "the amount otherwise deductible under this subsection [as defined by section
812(c)(2)]"; and
C= "property subject to general claims [as defined in the penultimate sentence of
section 812(c)]."
Then: X : A :: B : C.




60 This is because "the amount otherwise deductible under this subsection" (B in the
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Commentators have pointed out that the elaborately fashioned reduction
can be avoided in some states by the absurdly simple device of placing
previously taxed property in a revocable trust.61 Where such trust prop~
erty is not subject to the claims of creditors, it will not have to be re~
duced by any of the estate's deductions. This will be so despite the
decedent's retention for his life of the same control he would have had
if the property had not been placed in trust. Where local law provides
that property in a revocable trust remains subject to the claims of credi~
tors, other trust provisions to immunize the previously taxed property
from general claims can be adopted, though they entail the loss of some
control over the property.
Congress has thus struggled from 1921 to now to little avail. In point
of fact, however, its 1932 and 1942 theory that the previously taxed
property should be charged with part of the estate's deductions is about
as hard to defend as its equally unsuccessful 1921 effort to deny the sec-
tion 812 (c) deduction altogether when the previously taxed property was
used to pay charitable bequests or expenses. Unless the estate's deduc~
tions are greater because of the previously taxed property, the rationale
of the section 812 (c) deduction seems to dictate that the property, having
"paid its way" on the previous transfer, should go scot-free now. It
would make more sense to charge against it a share of the deductions of
the prior estate, a practice now followed (as has been seen) only with
respect to mortgages and liens chargeable against the property itself.
Having decided that previously taxed property should be charged with
a share of the second estate's deductions, however, how did Congress
happen to open such a broad route to avoidance of its purpose? The
formula supra note 59) includes only that part of the previously taxed property subject
to general claims. See section 812(c) (2). If none of the previously taxed property is




61 See Trachtman, Property Previollsly Taxed, 89 TRUS'fS & ESTATES 160 (1950);
MONTGOMERy'S FEDERAL TAXES-ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS 733 (1951). On the other
hand, increasing the amount of non-previously taxed property subject to general claims
increases the denominator of the fraction and thus is another way to prevent a reduction
of the section 812(c) deduction. Realizing this, taxpayers have several times tried to
prove that borderline items in an estate were really subject to general claims. E,g., Es-
tate of Susie C. Haggett, 14 T.C. 325 (1950); Estate of Emma H. Emanuel, 9 T.e. 779
(1947). Both cases involved revocable transfers in trust. If the property so transferred
had been previously taxed, the same question (whether the corpus was subject to general
claims) would have been present, but the e.''l:ecutors and Commissioner would have re-
versed their arguments. Supra note 60.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 8 Tax L. Rev. 281 1952-1953
1953] PREVIOUSLY TAXED PROPERTY AND FEDERAL ESTATE TA.X 281
Committee Reports show that this occurred in the effort to refine the
formula of reduction still further: 02
In some cases, however, the previously ta.xed property (or the property received
in exchange therefor) itself may not be wholly subject to general claims. In
such cases it is first necessary to reduce the deduction by the amount of the
deductible items under section 812(b) which, under the applicable law, in the
final adjustment and settlement of the estate may be enforced only against such
property. Then the balance, if any, of the deduction is to be reduced as pre-
viously indicated, this time, however, substituting for the full amount of 'the
amount othenvise deductible' only that part of such amount which is subject
to general claims. Thus, if in the e..xample previously given, Blackacre instead
of Whiteacre were the property previously ta.xed, the deduction would be
$20,000, computed by first reducing the $100,000 otherwise deductible by
$20,000, the amount of the mortgage enforceable only against Blackacre, and
then by reducing the balance, $80,000, by ~~~~:~~~ of $80,000.
This adjustment is of course entirely consonant with the Congressional
aim of allocating a portion of the "floating" deductions against the pre-
viously taxed property. It requires all deductions specifically chargeable
against that property to be applied against it first, and a fair share of
the rest of the deductions to be applied against the balance. The drafts-
men apparently overlooked the possibility that previously taxed property
might be immune to general claims not because it was encumbered by
specific claims but because it was not subject to claims at alll
THE EFFECTS OF THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
The latest, and most drastic, limitation on tlle deduction for property
previously taxed came in 1948. In creating the marital deduction, Con-
gress made three changes in section 812(c).03
First, in charging the previously ta.xed property with its share of the
present estate's other deductions-the restriction just discussed-Congress
included the estate's marital deduction as one of the amounts so to be
allocated. This change was consistent Witll the 1942 modifications.
Second, Congress provided that if the decedent received the property
62 Supra note 59, at 492-3. •
63 Revenue Act of 1948, Sec. 362. The changes do not apply to I.RC. §&i1 (a) (2), the
provision governing the deduction for property previously ta.",cd that is pari: of the estate
of a non-resiaent alien, apparently because the marital deduction itself was not made
applicable to such estates. But the estate of a non-resident alien may include property
inherited from a resident spouse who took advantage of the marital deduction. It is sur-
prising to find that the non-resident alien may deduct it under section 861(a) (2), 'when
a citizen cannot do so under section 811(c). The same anomaly c.~ts as to property
received by gift from a couple who took advantage of section 1000(£) to split the gift in
computing gift tax.
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by gift from a married couple, one-half should be considered as received
by the decedent from each spouse if the donors took advantage of the
option offered by section 1000(f) to split the gift for tax purposes. Thus,
if one spouse was able to apply a specific exemption against one-half of
the gift, while the other's specific exemption was exhausted, only one-half
will be regarded as property previously taxed. Were it not for this re-
striction, it might be asserted that "the amount finally determined as the
value of such property in determining the value of the gift" was its full
value. One problem is left unclarified. If only one-half of the donated
property is found in the estate at death, can it be "identified" in wpole
or in part with the half of the gift that was taxed? Should the far-sighted
donee deposit one-half of the gift in an account labelled "father's gift"
and the other half in an account labelled "mother's gift," using for per-
sonal expenses only the latter account if it was his mother who applied
her specific exemption against the gift when the transfer was made?
The third amendment to section 812 (c) is far more drastic. Congress
felt, properly, that if property had enjoyed the benefit of the marital de-
duction on the prior transfer, it had not "paid its way" so as to earn the
privileges of previously taxed property. Indeed, in some circumstances
allowance of the section 81Z(c) deduction to the widow on her death (or
to the widower on his) might have made a shambles of the estate tax.
If H left one-half of his property to Wand the rest to his children, and
W's estate (assuming her death within five years) got a section 81Z(c)
deduction for the very property that gave H's estate the marital deduction,
the whole family fortune would go to the children at the price of a tax on
only one-half. While the section 81Z (c) deduction should certainly be
denied here, a partial allowance would be quite appropriate if H had left
his entire estate to W.
But Congress, perhaps influenced by the present intricacy of section
81Z(c), apparently did not wish to grope for a formula defining when
the deduction should be allowed and when denied. Instead it enacted a
blanket disqualification of all property (a) received from the estate of a
prior decedent who was the spouse of the present decedent and who died
after December 31, 1947, or (b) received by gift after the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1948 from the present decedent's spouse.04 Since
spouses are more likely to die within a few years of each other than per-
64 Now we can look forward to some questions of identification. Suppose a bank ac-
count is made up of funds inherited within five years from a spouse, funds inherited within
five years from another testator, and other funds, and that the second decedent draws
indiscriminately on it for investments and living expenses. If the RodCllballgh rule, slIpra
note 39, is rejected, will the courts go so far as to presume that a testator not only
meant to invest inherited funds, but that he intended to invest only the funds that would
qualify for deduction under section 812(c)?
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sons of different generations, the 1948 change prevents section 812(c)
from being applied to precisely those situations where it is most needed.o:!
This of course adds fuel to the passion, which may have unfortunate
personal consequences, of leaving to a spouse the amount of the maxi-
mum marital deduction and not a penny more. '\Thile a "refined inte-
gration" of the marital deduction with the previously ta.xed property de-
duction might have been a forbidding task,00 it would have been possible
to provide that if W received any amount in excess of the marital deduc-
tion taken on the transfer, that excess would qualify for the section 812(c)
deduction.
CONCLUSION
In any comprehensive revision of the federal estate and gift tax struC4
ture-already long overdue67-section 812(c) will require a thorough
overhauling. Several observers, indeed, have proposed reforms so thor-
ough-going that no room would be left for section 812(c).03 Other pro-
posals, however, would preserve the deduction but alter it CA'iensively.03
So far as we can judge, the more drastic suggestions have so little pros-
pect of adoption, that at least for the foreseeable future the question of
a deduction for previously ta.xed property will remain with us.
The statutory aim of the deduction-to prevent an "unconscionable
dilution of an estate"7°-is appealing. Yet we know almost nothing of
the extent of the problem. In 1945, the last year for which details are
available, the average deduction for previously ta.xed property was about
65 Of the reported federal cases dealing with the deduction for property previously
ta.'\:ed, almost half involve transfers by one spouse to another.
66 Surrey, Federal Ta~ation of tTte Family-TTte Revellue Act of 19:18. 61 HAnv. L
REv. 1097, 1136-38 (1948).
67 "The estate and gift ta.'\:es have been the neglected stepchildren of the federal reve-
nue system. The care and attention lavisbed on the federal income ta.. have been notice-
ably absent in the case of these transfer taxes. The rudimentary beginnings in 1916 of
the 'modern' estate ta.., to use the adjective in only a chronological sense, have been suc-
ceeded by patchwork revisions both as to technical features and revenue features." Surrey,
An [,ttrodm:tiOlt to Revision of tTte Federal Estate alld Gift T~es. 38 CM.1F. L. REv. 1
(1950).
68 One such reform is the "bequeathing power succession ta. .:' which would m3ke the
tax independent of the number of transfers and dependent upon the 3ge dilIerenful be-
tween transferor and transferee. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGllESSIVi: TA.-.ATIOl: 224-48
(1947). Another is the proposal that estate and gift taxes be abolished and all gratuitous
receipts be taxed to the recipient as income. SWONS, PERSONAL INCOME TA.-..ATIO:: 125-
47 (1938).
69 FEDERAL ESTATE A1ID GUT TA.'G:S, A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION .um Foa CO:lIlELA-
TION WITH THE INCOME TAX 61 (Joint Study by Advisory Committee to Tre:lSury Depart-
ment and Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, 1947) j Rudick, A Proposal for an Acces-
sions T=,1 TAX L. REv. 25, 40-1 (1945).
10 Rudick, supra note 69.
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$4,000 per taxable estate and $450 per non-taxable estate.11 But these
bare figures scarcely support any firm conclusions as to the importance
of some provision, not necessarily the present one, for property previously
taxed. For one thing, they tell nothing of the amount of tax paid on the
prior transfer. The Treasury, by inspecting the prior returns, could as~
certain in how many cases the second tax, if the property previously
taxed had not been deducted, would have worked "an unconscionable
dilution" of the estate. This task should certainly be undertaken as a pro~
logue to any revision of the law.
It may be that the supposed problem does not arise frequently enough
to justify a statutory safeguard, though of course mere frequency alone
should not be the test, since grave unfairness in a few cases may be wor~
thier of statutory attention than slight inequity in more instances. More~
over, the published statistics report the deductions taken rather than the
value of the property previously taxed. A Treasury report on the amount
of property involved before the statutory downward adjustments are ap~
plied would better show the extent of the problem than the amount of
the net deduction. No Treasury study, to be sure, will uncover the pre~
viously taxed property that is never claimed on the return because identi~
fication is thought by the executor to be totally impossible. Perhaps the
tax rate pattern for such property would not differ markedly from the
pattern for identifiable property. If there is a difference, it would prob~
ably be that unidentifiable property is less heavily taxed at either transfer;
where a heavy tax has been paid or is in prospect, there is more likely
to be a tax advisor who will warn about the importance of a separate
account for the previously taxed property.
If there is need for a safeguard against two taxes in rapid succession,
it is clear that section 812 (c) does not now provide it. The requirement
of identification, serving no policy purpose, acts as the first restriction.
Where the property can be properly traced, it must be reduced, perhaps
drastically, by a portion of the second estate's deductions. Finally, prop~
erty received from a spouse will ordinarily not qualify at all.
. On the other hand, in one way section 812 (c) is too lavish. In seeking
to prevent "unconscionable dilution," it may facilitate the escape of a
generation of taxes, where property is transferred from father to son to
grandson, a loophole of some importance if the first transfer was taxed
lightly. Of course, if we can swallow the life-estate-remainder sequence,12
we should perhaps not strain at this relatively minor defect in the estate
tax structure. But when reform comes, it will be hard to defend the way
11 U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, STATISTICS OF INCOME }'OR 1944 (Part 1) 304 (1950).
12 Surrey, supra note 66, at 1&-23.
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section 812 (c) confers blanket immunity upon all previously ta.xed prop-
erty without regard to the amount of ta.x paid on the prior transfer.
These observations lead us to suggest the following changes in section
812(c) if a Treasury study of the kind suggested discloses sufficient
reason for the retention of some allowance for previously ta.xed property:
1. No tracing or identification should be required. No one has ever
advanced a shred of reason for distinguishing between the heir who re-
tains his patrimony intact while living on his "own" funds, and his brother
who does the reverse.
2. The value of the property' as othenvise determined should not be
reduced by any part of the second estate's deductions. 'While it is possible
that some of these deductions are greater because of the inherited property,
the possibility (except for the marital deduction) is too flimsy to form
the basis for a statutory restriction.
3. The 1948 disqualification of all property received from a spouse
should be moderated, as suggested earlier, so that any e....cess over the mari-
tal deduction will be entitled to the section 812 (c) deduction.
4. The tax actually paid on the prior transfer should be taken into ac-
count. This could be done by converting the deduction into a credit in
the following way:
(a) compute a "tentative" ta.... on the estate as reduced by the value
of the previously taxed property;
(b) compute a tax on the estate including the previously taxed prop-
erty, and credit against the ta.x so computed the amount of tax actually
levied on the prior transfer (an amount bearing the same relation to the
total tax paid as the value of the transferred property bore to the net
estate or to the total net gifts of the year in question) ;
(c) the tax to be paid would be the higher of (a) and (b).
APPENDIX
[Sec.8I2(c)]
(c) Property Previou.sly Taxed.-An amount equal to the value of any
property (1) fanning a part of the gross estate situated in the United States of
any person who died within five years prior to the death of the decedent, or (2)
transferred to the decedent by gift within five years prior to his death, (where
such property can be identified as having been received by the decedent from the
donor by gift, or from such prior decedent by gift, bequest, devise, or inherit-
ance, or which can be identified as having been acquired in e.xcllange for prop-
erty so received.) Property includible in the gross estate of the prior decedent
under section 811 (f) and property included in total gifts of the donor under
section 1000(c) received by the decedent described in this subsection sball, for
the purposes of this subsection, be considered a bequest of such prior decedent
or gift of such donor. This deduction shall be allowed only where a gift ta.... im-
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posed under Chapter 4, or under Title III of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat.
245, or an estate tax imposed under this chapter or any prior Act of Congress,
was finally determined and paid by or on behalf of such donor, or the estate of
such prior decedent, as the case may be, and only in the amount finally deter-
mined as the value of such property in determining the value of the gift, or the
gross estate of such prior decedent, and only to the extent that the value of such
property is included in the decedent's gross estate, and only if in determining
the value of the net estate of the prior decedent no deduction was allowable
under this subsection, section 861 (a) (2), or the corresponding provisions of
any prior Act of Congress, in respect of the property or property given in ex-
change therefor.
The following property shall not, for the purposes of this subsection, be con-
sidered as property with respect to which a deduction may be allowed: (A)
property received from a prior decedent who died after December 31, 1947,
and was at the time of such death the decedent's spouse, (B) property received
by gift after the date of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1948 from a
donor who at the time of the gift was the decedent's spouse, and (C) property
acquired in exchange for property described in clause (A) or (B).
Where, under the provisions of section 1000(f), a gift received by the de-
cedent was considered as made one-half by the donor and one~half by the
donor's spouse, one-half of the gift shall be considered as received by the dece-
dent from each such spouse.
Where a deduction was allowed of any mortgage or other lien in determining
the gift tax, or the estate tax of the prior decedent, which was paid in whole
or in part prior to the decedent's death, then the deduction allowable under this
subsection shall be reduced by the amount so paid. The deduction under this
subsection shall be reduced by an amount which bears the same ratio to the
amounts allowed as deductions under subsections (a), (d), and (e) and the
amounts of general claims allowed as deductions under subsection (b) as the
amount othenvise deductible under this subsection bears to property subject ,to
general claims. If the property includible in the gross estate to which the de,
duction under this subsection is attributable is not wholly property subject to
general claims-
(1) before the application of the preceding sentence, the amount of the
deduction under this subsection shall be reduced by that part of such
amount as the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of such property
(to which such deduction is attributable) subject to claims but not to gen-
eral claims is of the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of such
property, and
(2) in the application of the preceding sentence in reducing the balance,
if any, of such deduction, "the amount othenvise deductible under this
subsection" shall be only that part of such amount otherwise deductible
(determined without regard to clause (1) of this paragraph) as the value,
at the time of the decedent's death, of such property (to which such deduc~
tion is attributable) subject to general claims is of the value, at the time of
the decedent's death, of such property.
For the purposes of the two preceding sentences and this sentence, "general
claims" are the amounts allowed as deductions under subsection (b) which,
under the applicable law, in the final adjustment and settlement of the estate
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may be enforced against any property subject to claims. as defined in subsection
(b). and "property subject to general claims" is the value. at the time of the
decedent's death. of property subject to claims, as defined in subsection (b),
reduced by the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of that part of such
property against which amounts allowed as deductions under subsection (b)
which are not general claims may be enforced. under the applicable law. in the
final adjustment and settlement of the estate. "Vhere the property referred to
in this subsection consists of two or more items the aggregate value of such
items shall be used for the purpose of computing the deduction.
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